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SUPERSENIORITY:
POST-DAIRYLEA DEVELOPMENTS
The validity of the assignment of artificialseniority.to key union officials as a
means of ensuringtheir continuedpresence on theJob is an issue which has repeatedly divided the NationalLabor Relations Board In Dairylea Cooperative, Inc.
and Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, the Boardheldthat allsuperseniorityprovisionsnot limitedto layoff and recallwerepresumptively invalidunder section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act as unlawful encouragement of union
membershi. This standardmarked a departurefrom the Board's traditionalpolicy
of noninterference with the substantive provisions of collective bargainingagreements. Post-Dairyleadecisions,however, have expanded the scope of clauses which
may qualfy aspresumptivelylawful The authorexamines the standardsestablished
prior to Dairylea for evaluating the impact of collective bargainingprovisions on
employee rights. He then analyzes the Dairylea standardand itsgradualmodification in subsequent cases. He concludes by evaluating each approachin terms ofits
impact on the flexibility of the parties in negotiating a collective bargaining
agreement.
INTRODUCTION

S UPERSENIORITY,

the assignment of artificial seniority' to
certain high-ranking union members, functions to protect its
holders in their employment by ensuring their job security and by
insulating them from the exercise of favoritism toward other employees. Because superseniority is conferred irrespective of length
of service, its beneficiaries are considered to be most senior, often
to the detriment of employees who have accrued greater seniority
on account of longer employment. As a result, concern arises with
respect to protecting employee rights under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).2
1. Seniority is defined as the length of service that determines the relative claim to
jobs and prerogatives related to employment. For a discussion of seniority, see Poplin, Fair
Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 177,
196-199 (1975).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) (originally enacted as the Wagner Act, ch. 198, 49
Stat. 449 (1935)).
Section 7 of the NLRA protects the rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively and to engage in peaceful concerted activities, or to refrain from all such activities:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
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As with all seniority provisions, superseniority is regarded as a
proper subject for collective bargaining, 3 and a significant number

of employees are in fact covered by collective bargaining agreements that include superseniority clauses. 4 Employers tend to re-

sist the inclusion of a superseniority provision in a collective
bargaining agreement for fear of creating a privileged class and
placing too high a premium upon union office holding.' On the
other hand, unions favor superseniority clauses as an effective de-

vice for retaining key members in influential bargaining positions.
Thus, superseniority is most frequently used for protection against
layoffs of shop stewards and grievance committeemen, persons
who initiate the grievance procedures and who are instrumental in
Section 8 of the Act enumerates several classes of employer and labor organization
activities that constitute unfair labor practices:
(a) Unfair labor practices by employer
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourageor discourage membership in any labor
organization...
(b)

Unfair labor practices by labor organization
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title...

(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization
has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership...
Id § 158 (emphasis added).
The phrase "encourage membership" has been interpreted, within the meaning of
§ 8(a)(3), to encompass "not only discrimination which induces workers to join a union,
but also conduct which encourages employees to be 'good' union members, to support and
assist the union, or to participate in union activities." NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy
Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1165 (2d Cir. 1976).
3. As a condition of employment, seniority is a mandatory bargaining subject pursuant to § 8(d) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). See, e.g., United Steelworkers Local
1070, 171 N.L.R.B. 945, 946 (1968).
4. According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics study of 1570 "major collective bargaining agreements" (collective bargaining agreements which affect 1,000 or more workers),
41% contained superseniority clauses. The total number of workers affected by the agreements studied was 6,741,750 of which 43% were covered by superseniority provisions. U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2013, CHARACTERISTICS OF
MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS (1976).
5. C. RANDLE & M. WORTMAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 503 (2d ed. 1966).

SUPERSENIORITY

bargaining relationship between
promoting an advantageous
6
union and employer.
Although the National Labor Relations Board has approved
the use of superseniority as a proper employment practice provided that it does not infringe employee rights,7 the circumstances
under which superseniority clauses are considered to be valid is a
subject of continuing controversy. Prior to any decisions addressing the precise issue of the validity of superseniority provisions,
the Supreme Court developed a framework within which to determine whether employee rights were infringed under the NLRA.
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,Inc.,8 the Court divided conduct
which discriminated on the basis of union membership into that
which is "inherently destructive" of employee rights and that
which has only a "comparatively slight" impact on employee interests. 9 When the conduct or clause falls under the former
classification, an unfair labor practice may be found without proof
of improper motive and despite evidence of business justification;
when it is classified within the second category, however, any presumption of illegality is rebuttable by a showing of "legitimate
and substantial" business justification.' ° Under this test, the
Board does not interfere until a point in time after the conduct has
occurred or the clause in question has been agreed and acted
upon.
Several years after the Supreme Court framework had been
developed, the Board decided Dairylea Cooperative,Inc. andMilk
Drivers& DairyEmployees Local 338,1 which directly addressed
the issue of superseniority. The Board decision clothed all superseniority provisions not limited on their face to layoff and recall
with a presumption of illegality, irrespective of the Supreme Court
dichotomy,' on the ground that such clauses unlawfully encouraged union membership in violation of section 8 of the
NLRA. 13 After Dairylea, those parties asserting the validity of
such clauses had the burden of offering justification to support a
finding of legality. By establishing such a presumption, the Board
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
ployees
12.
13.

Id
See, eg., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
Id at 34.
Id
219 N.L.R.B. 656 (1975), enforcedsub nom NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy EmLocal 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976).
219 N.L.R.B. at 658.
Id.,enforced, 531 F.2d at 1166. See note 2 supra.
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sanctioned interference with the substance of collective bargaining
agreements during the negotiation stage, thereby deviating from
its longstanding policy of self-restraint with respect to substantive
4
collective bargaining.1
A series of decisions after Dairylea,however, has expanded the
scope of superseniority clauses which qualify as presumptively
valid. The rationale underlying this development has been that
the provisions served to protect those parties instrumental in the
bargaining process. 5 The post-Dairyleaexpansion is the result of
case-by-case determination, and no limit to the evolution is as yet
apparent.
The Dairyleadecision represented an embellishment of the basic test enunciated by the Supreme Court for evaluating the impact of collective bargaining provisions on employee rights.
While the Dairyleaapproach has not been expressly repudiated, it
must be re-examined in light of its application in subsequent decisions. Thus, while the approaches developed for evaluating superseniority provisions overlap, the Supreme Court framework, the
Dairyleatest, and the post-Dairylealine of decisions seem to span
a discernible spectrum. With respect to the burden of proof, the
range of tests extends from the Dairylea presumption of illegality
to the presumption of lawfulness manifested in the Supreme
Court framework and in Member Fanning's view set out in his
Dairylea dissent. 6 As a function of the allocation of the burden
of proof, the standards also vary according to the degree to which
they promote flexibility in collective bargaining agreements.
Dairylea appears to violate the principle that the Board should
not interfere with the results of the collective bargaining process."
14. The role of the Board in industrial relations consists largely of maneuvering the
parties to the bargaining table. Once the bargaining relationship is established, the Board's
role is limited to defining the mandatory subjects over which the parties must bargain
under § 8(d), and to ensuring that the parties negotiate in good faith. Employers may be
compelled to engage in collective bargaining with the employees' bargaining representative. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). However, even if the employer attempts to
destroy a union's support, the Board can do nothing but bring the parties back to the bargaining table through the imposition of a bargaining order. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575 (1969). The Board can never compel the making of bargaining concessions,
nor act as an arbiter of what is included in a collective bargaining agreement. NLRA
§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Because a collective bargaining agreement is privately
negotiated, the Board traditionally has been reluctant to disturb its terms, except if the
agreement runs afoul of the Act.
15. See, e.g., Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians Local 780 (McGregor-Werner,
Inc.), 229 N.L.R.B. 1319 (1977).
16. See notes 67-68 infra and accompanying text.
17. See note 14 supra.
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A collective bargaining agreement, by its very nature, must be
flexible; 8 it is the product of trade-offs and compromises between
the employer and union, often reached only after months of negotiation. The presence of a superseniority clause, as with any
clause granting benefits, represents one such trade-off, for the
union must have conceded a bargaining demand to the employer
in exchange for superseniority. 19 For the Board to void a provision of an agreement is to upset the delicate, bargained-for ar-

rangement created by employer and union, and therefore, to
contravene Board policy against interference with collective bargaining results.2"
This Note explores the development of the various approaches
to evaluating superseniority clauses. It examines the relative mer-

its and problems of each approach as it affects the ability of the
parties to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement and con-

cludes by suggesting a return to the standard originally articulated
by the Supreme Court in Great Dane.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT FRAMEWORK FOR SECTIONS 8(A)(3)

AND

8(B)(2)

OF THE

NLRA

The Supreme Court has established guidelines for the applica18. "The collective bargainers can not foresee all of the problems that are sure to arise
and can not provide for the innumerable details of the future administration of the bargain." 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1420, at 344 (1962). See also Fanning, We Are
Forty-Where Do We Go?, 27 LABOR LJ. 3, 9 (1976).
19. See Leonard, PracticalApplicationsof Superseniority, 26 LABOR L.J. 44 (1975).
20. The substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement are those negotiated
and agreed to by the parties in a bargained-for exchange. See Cox, The Duty to Bargainin
Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958). The Board position in Dairylea acts as a
substantive restraint because it narrows the parties' trade-off choices and reduces the degree to which union and employer can negotiate as adversaries in reaching agreement.
Moreover, the strength of the restraint is augmented by the frequency with which bargaining relationships continue from one agreement to the next: Most rights and duties remain
unchanged in successive agreements. Summers, Collective 4greements and the Law of
Contracts,78 YALE L.J. 525, 533 (1969). Thus, Board intervention in typical industrial
practices, such as the use of superseniority, affects not merely one negotiation period between employer and union, but an entire bargaining relationship. Indeed, the superseniority clause in the Dairylea case had been incorporated into successive agreements for
more than 30 years. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162,
1164 (2d Cir. 1976).
Substantive restraints also inhibit the ability of the parties to accommodate unforeseen
problems that arise in the bargaining relationship. The parties agree on substantive terms
anticipating that modifications may be necessary. Deliberate ambiguities may remain and
unforeseen contingencies will arise, but the parties plan for these by creating a structured
grievance procedure, usually involving binding arbitration, which allows for modification
of the bargaining relationship. See Summers, supra at 535.
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tion and scope of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, which
prohibit unlawful encouragement or discouragement of union
membership. Section 8(a)(3) prohibits an employer from acting to
"encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization"
by use of "discrimination; '2 1 section 8(b)(2) forbids a union "to
cause or attempt to cause an employer to violate section 8(a)(3)"
or to discriminate against an employee whose union membership
has been denied or terminated for any reason other than failure to
pay dues or initiation fees.22 The purpose of these provisions was
described by the Court in Radio Officers v. NLRB:23 "The policy
of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their organizational
rights. Thus §§ 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) were designed to allow employees to freely exercise their right to join unions, be good, bad,
or indifferent members, or abstain from joining any union without
imperiling their livelihood."'2
Radio Officers was the consolidation of three cases which addressed the issue of unlawful encouragement of union membership.2 Its significance with respect to the issue of superseniority
lies in the Court's determination that proof of unlawful purpose is
essential to the establishment of a section 8(a)(3) or 8(b)(2) violation.26 The Court was presented with the issues of whether effect
or motive of discrimination, or both, must be furnished by the
Board, and whether they may be inferred, or must be established
by specific evidence. 27 The Court posited motive as an essential
element of 8(a)(3), 28 but added that motive may be inferred where
the employer's conduct "inherently encourages or discourages
union membership" or "where a natural consequence of his action
was such encouragement or discouragement." 29 Once these "cer21. For the pertinent language of § 8(a)(3), see note 2 supra.
22. Id
23. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
24. Id at 40.
25. Two cases involved failure to abide by union rules, one resulting in reduction in
an employee's seniority, the other in suspension. Id at 24-26, 28-31. The third case involved an employer's granting of wage increases and vacation benefits solely to union
members. Id at 34-36.
26. Id at 43.
27. Id at 42-52. See Christensen and Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of
Unfair Labor Practices.- The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality,77 YALE L.J. 1269,
1286 (1968).
28. 347 U.S. at 43. The motive requirement applies to both § 8(a)(3) and § 8(b)(2)
violations since § 8(a)(3) is an element of the behavior prohibited by § 8(b)(2). See note 2
supra.

29. 347 U.S. at 48-51. The Board may draw reasonable inferences on this issue from
proven facts and from experience. Id at 49.
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tain types" of discrimination are shown to exist, specific evidence
of motivation need not be offered since the requisite intent can be
inferred from the foreseeable consequences of the discrimination.30 Unfortunately, the Court did not indicate what "types" of
discrimination supply their own proof of motivation, nor did it
clarify if and when the established intent was rebuttable.
In Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
NLRB,3 ' the Court's approach marked a subtle retreat from Radio
Officers. Local 357 involved an arrangement by which the employees were required to use the union's hiring hall. Dispatching
from the hall was to be determined according to the relative seniority of the employees, irrespective of their union or nonunion
status. 32 The Court rejected the Board's finding that union hiring
halls were unlawful per se. 33 The Court acknowledged that the
hiring hall arrangement encouraged union membership. Nevertheless, it refused to permit the Board to infer, in the absence of
specific evidence, union discrimination against nonmembers
where employees were dispatched pursuant to a negotiaited agreement which was nondiscriminatory on its face. 34 The Court reasoned that unlike specific encouragement brought about by
discrimination, encouragement offered by a negotiated plan which
was nondiscriminatory on its face does not violate sections 8(a)(3)
and 8(b)(2).35
Local 357 departed from Radio Officers by refusing to infer
discrimination unless the disparate treatment accorded employees
was based upon their union membership. 36 Thus, while motive
and effect are still provable by inference instead of direct evidence, Local 357 undercuts Radio Officers by warning that the
Board's power to infer is not unlimited.
30. Id at 45, 51-52. The Court also observed that "the Act does not require that the

employees discriminated against be the individuals encouraged for purposes of violations
of§ 8(a)(3)." Id at 51.
31. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
32. Id at 668-69.

33. Id at 673, 676.
34. Id at 675-76.
35.

Id

36. The dissent in Local 357 argued that "discrimination" within the meanipg of
§ 8(a)(3) means "all differences in treatment regardless of their basis." Id at 688 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). Implicit in such an interpretation is an assertion that once two groups of employees are treated differently, a violation is demonstrated merely by proving that the treatment encouraged or discouraged union membership. Once it is established that a
discriminatory practice has the natural effect of encouraging or discouraging union membership, the requisite motive may be inferred under Radio Offcers. Id at 688-90.
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With respect to the proper construction of sections 8(a)(3) and
8(b)(2), Local 357 also raised the problem of weighing conflicting
interests in the absence of direct evidence of motive. The Court
postponed its resolution of this issue until its decision in NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers,Inc.,3 which formulated principles of proof
of motive by establishing two categories of section 8(a)(3) violations. The first category is comprised of situations in which the
discriminatory conduct is "inherently destructive of important
employee rights."' 38 Such conduct supplies "its own indicia of intent," and an unfair labor practice may be found regardless of a
showing of business justification. 39 The second category embraces
situations in which "the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct or employee rights is 'comparatively slight.' "4 Here, the
Board must prove motive if the employer or union has proffered
"legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct."4"
In GreatDane, the Court held that section 8(a)(3) was violated
when the employer refused to pay strikers the same vacation benefits accorded nonstrikers and returning strikers.4 2 The conduct fell
within the second category of section 8(a)(3) violations, and the
Court indicated that presumptive unlawfulness under the NLRA
could be rebutted with evidence of "legitimate and substantial
business justification."4 3 However, since the employer in Great
Dane failed to come forward with any justification, the Court affirmed the Board's inference of unlawful motive.'
Great Dane prescribes a test for evaluating section 8(a)(3) and
8(b)(2) violations absent direct evidence of motive.4 5 The inquiry
37. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
38. Id at 33-34.
39. Id (quoting in part NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 231 (1963)).
40. 388 U.S. at 34.
41. Id
42. Id at 29.
43. Id at 34.
44. Id
45. In the context of superseniority, "direct evidence of motive" is specific evidence
which shows that a union's steward selection policies are based upon a deliberate purpose
on the part of the union, the employer, or both, to reward union membership through the
granting of superseniority. This type of evidence is often unobtainable by the General
Counsel. Consequently, where such evidence is not available, the Court permits the Board
to draw inferences of unlawful motive. See Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 48-52
(1954), and text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
It is interesting to note that the GreatDane framework partially evolved from the superseniority case ofNLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). However, Erie Resistor
differs factually from Dairylea and its progeny. Unlike Dairylea and the later decisions,
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is essentially one of deciding whether the proffered justification
sufficiently rebuts any presumption of illegality which may attach
to the conduct or provision in question because of its infringement
of employee rights. Arguably, the Great Dane test is an adequate
standard for the Board to employ in evaluating any superseniority
clause. Technically, the granting of superseniority constitutes
"discrimination" within the meaning of sections 8(a)(3) and
8(b)(2). However, the test enables the Board to salvage collective
bargaining agreements which fall literally within the 8(a)(3) or
8(b)(2) prohibitions when they are not inherently discriminatory
and the employer or union presents a legitimate business justification.
Moreover, use of this framework is desirable because it fosters
flexibility in collective bargaining. In other words, the test makes
no affirmative specifications as to substance of superseniority
clauses, and thus enables parties to tailor the clause according to
the relative bargaining power and skill of the employer and union.
Under the Great Dane approach, a superseniority provision would
be treated like any other clause in a collective bargaining agreement that may be negotiated. However, unlike an approach that
delineates precise boundaries within which a clause must be
drawn, the Supreme Court framework introduces an element of
uncertainty into negotiations since negotiators cannot be assured
that the clause will pass Supreme Court muster. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that whatever restraint this uncertainty injects
into collective bargaining will exist under any approach, since all
subsequent tests are based on the Great Dane formulation.
II.

DAIRYLEA

In Dairylea, a profitable milk delivery route became available
at Dairylea Cooperative, Inc. Dairylea was required by the colErie Resistor did not involve a superseniority provision which was bargained for and embodied in a collective bargaining agreement. Rather, the employer in that case attempted
to restore production during a strike by offering returning strikers 20 years superseniority
against future layoffs. Id at 222-24. In that case, the Court affirmed the Board's determination that the superseniority plan was inherently destructive of the right to strike, and
therefore violated §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Id at 233-36. The employer offered a business justification that these additional benefits were necessary to continue operations during the strike. Id at 222-23. In light of this and the absence of any direct
evidence of unlawful motive offered by the Board, the Court viewed the inquiry as a matter
of balancing the interests involved to determine whether the clause was "inherently discriminatory." The Court resolved the balance in favor of the strikers, finding that the
sbperseniority plan was "inherently discriminatory." Ie at 235.
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lective bargaining agreement to give the job to the applicant with
the greatest seniority.46 Seven drivers, including a union steward
and an employee with twenty-four more years of service than the
steward, applied for the job. Since the steward was considered
most senior under the superseniority provision, he was awarded
the route.47 A charge was filed and a complaint was issued by the
Board against Dairylea and the union, Local 338.48 The complaint alleged that both Dairylea and the union violated sections
49 8(a)(3),5 ° 8(b)(l)(A), 51 and 8(b)(2) 5 2 of the NLRA by un8(a)( 1),
lawfully encouraging union membership by providing for and enforcing a superseniority clause.5 3 Twice the parties waived an
evidentiary hearing to establish the foundation for the existence of
the provision; instead they submitted the case directly to the
Board.5 4
The Board found that by maintaining and enforcing the superseniority clause, the employer had violated sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) and that Local 338 had violated sections 8(b)(1)(A) and
8(b)(2) of the NLRA. 5 5 The Board determined that the on-the-job
benefits flowing from the clause could be obtained only if an employee was a "good, enthusiastic unionist,"5 6 thereby tying job
46. The agreement provided that "[t]he steward shall be considered the Senior employee in the craft in which he is employed." Dairylea Coop., Inc. and Milk Drivers &
Dairy Employees Local 338, 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 657 (1975). The parties agreed that the
provision gave the steward superseniority with respect to layoff and recall, as well as contractual benefits such as assignment of overtime, selection of vacation period, and work
assignment. Id at 657.
47. Id
48. Id at 656.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). For the text of this provision, see note 2 supra.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). For the pertinent text of this provision, see note 2
supra.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976). For the pertinent text of this provision, see note 2
supra.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976). For the pertinent text of this provision, see note 2
supra.
53. 219 N.L.R.B. at 657.
54. The Board remanded the case for hearing before an Administrative Law Judge to
allow the parties to justify the superseniority clause. Id at 659 n.9. The parties again
waived a hearing on the ground that no evidence was available as to the intent of the
drafters of the clause. 1d at 661. Dairylea and the union had originally entered into the
agreement containing this clause in 1937. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1164 (2d Cir. 1976).
55. 219 N.L.R.B. at 659. In addition, the Board held that by awarding the route to the
union steward, the company had discriminated against other employees in violation of
§§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), and that the union had violated §§ 8(b)(l)(A) and 8(b)(2). Id See
note 2 supra.
56. Id at 658.
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rights and benefits to union activities. The Board held that superseniority provisions not limited to layoff and recall were presumptively unlawful and 5that
the provision in the Dairylea agreement
7
NLRA.
the
violated
Local 338 argued that seniority is a matter of contract, ratified
by Dairylea employees. Therefore, the contractual nature of the
provision precluded a finding of unlawfulness, irrespective of the
purpose served by the provision.58 The union also contended that
there was no basis for finding the alleged violation under 8(b)(2)
absent a showing of union motive to encourage or discourage
union membership.5 9
The Board countered these arguments by stating that the only
realistic way an employee could gain preference to job benefits
was through enthusiastic union support.6" In his dissent, Member
Fanning challenged this conclusion as unwarranted because it was
based on the dubious assumption that the union rewards members
by making them stewards on the basis of their allegiance to the
union, rather than on their merit and ability. In Fanning's view,
"it is unrealistic to assume that the Union values an easy and selfserving enthusiasm over merit and ability in selection for a post
upon which its own continued well being and future vitality depend."6 1 In response to this argument, the majority noted that a
union will never choose an employee who is uninterested in the
union's success for such a sensitive post.62 Moreover, the Board
provided a second argument in opposition to Fanning's contentions. Assuming arguendo, that union activities played no role in
selection of union stewards, the Board pointed out that these activities were a determinative factor in employee access to benefits
under the clause. Participation in union activities such as stewardship was a prerequisite to obtaining certain preferences under
the disputed clause; without such participation, the significance of
57. Id It should be noted, however, that the Board refused to find clauses which went
beyond layoffand recall per se unlawful since there may be an adequate justification forthcoming. The Board also noted that the burden of rebutting the presumption rests with the
party asserting the legality of the clause. Id
58. Id at-657.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id at 662 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
62. Id at 657-58. The steward's duties included reporting violations of the collective
bargaining agreement by the employer and enforcing union rules. The union maintained
sole discretion in the selection of the steward. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees
Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1166 (2d Cir. 1976).
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merit and ability was minimal.6 3 For these reasons, the majority
inferred unlawful encouragement of union membership.' 4
Dissenting Member Fanning argued that the only reasonable
conclusion or inference to be drawn from the evidence was that
the superseniority clause encouraged or rewarded service as a
steward, rather than illegally encouraging union membership.6 5
Fanning claimed that recognition of a steward's service by means
of a seniority system was entirely lawful.6 6 He concluded by stating that there was no evidence of any discrimination in the selection of stewards, and no basis for a conclusion that measuring
seniority by service to the bargaining unit as a steward violated
the NLRA as a matter of law. 67 Since Fanning thought that the
union steward selection process would not operate in a manner
that would encourage union membership, he seemed to be advocating that a very strict burden of proof be met by the General
Counsel-that improper motive be shown by direct evidence and
not by inference:
To find a violation of the law when both the apparent purpose
and effect of an act are lawful, it is not enough that there could
be some hidden and unlawful purpose or possible unlawful effect. That hidden purpose must be bared, the likelihood of that
conjectured effect proven. I believe that we can all agree that it
is unjust and unreasonable to clothe outwardly lawful conduct
with a semblance68 of illegality woven wholly from conjecture
and supposition.
Thus, according to Fanning, there was a clear absence of proof
that the NLRA had been violated.
The Second Circuit enforced the Board's order, although it
found violations of only three sections of the Act, 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3)
and 8(b)(2). 69 The court emphasized the Board's ability as trier
of fact to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented.
Because the Board's holding appeared both reasonable and fair,
63. 219 N.L.R.B. at 658.
64. As Member Fanning noted, the inference drawn by the majority is extraordinary
in light of the fact that employees were already required to be union members under a
lawful union-security clause. Id at 662 (Fanning, Member, dissenting). The possibility
remains, however, that in agreements without a union-security clause there may be senior
nonunion employees who will suffer because of super-senior union stewards.
65. Id at 662 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
66. Id (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
67. Id at 663 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
68. Id at 662 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
69. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1166-67 (2d
Cir. 1976). Since the court sustained the Board's order under § 8(b)(2), it felt that it was
unnecessary to consider the § 8(b)(1)(A) violation. Id at 1165 n.3.
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the court sustained the Board's conclusion that disparate treatment with respect to benefits accorded stewards and nonstewards
unlawfully encouraged union membership.7" The court also suggested that unions, in order to attract qualified personnel, grant
union salaries or non-job-related benefits instead of superseniority.71 Admittedly, such benefits would also encourage union
membership. However, the court of appeals noted that encouragement of union membership does not in and of itself violate the
Act, since the union may proffer "evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications."7 2 Absent direct evidence of motive, the Board may infer from the evidence before it that a certain
superseniority clause has a discriminatory effect not mitigated by
the apparent purpose served by the clause.73 Thus, any superseniority clause not limited on its face to layoff and recall is presumptively unlawful under Dairylea, and the burden of rebutting that
presumption falls upon the party asserting the legality of the provision.
The Dairylea standard can be analyzed as serving a two-fold
purpose. First, it imposes a burden upon those who seek to uphold any superseniority clause not limited to layoff and recall as a
means of protecting against undue infringement of employees'
section 7 rights. The court was troubled by "the widely disparate
treatment accorded stewards and nonstewards" under the agreement74 and the fact that "[t]he steward's perquisites [were] rather
more extensive and tangible than his duties. ' 75 Furthermore,
since the steward's position was not threatened, the union could
not offer what the General Counsel and the court agreed was a
legitimate justification for the exercise of superseniority in a layoff
situation: that "a union may find itself powerless to supply any
70. Id at 1165. The court cited Judge Friendly's proposition that "[t]he Board knows
the facts of life in the labor world better than we ever can; we ought not upset its conclusion
as to 'encouragement' unless we can say this is without rational basis." Id at 1165 n.5
(quoting NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 184 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J., dissenting)).
71. 531 F.2d at 1166.
72. Id (quoting NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967)). See text
accompanying notes 37-45 supra.
73. 531 F.2d at 1165-66. The Second Circuit noted the burden of imposing upon the
General Counsel the requirement that he produce detailed evidence of the union's policy
for selecting stewards. The court reasoned that to permit the inference of unlawful encouragement of union membership absent specific evidence would not automatically invalidate
the clause. The union could still rebut the inference or offer a Great Dane justification for
the clause. Id at 1166 n.6.
74. Id at 1166.
75. Id at 1164.
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real representation if it is unable to maintain the same steward
continuously on the job."76 Thus, Dairylea presented the court
with a situation in which the degree of infringement of employee
rights could not be justified by the substantial preference accorded
the union steward: the preference was not directly related to the
steward's duties of representation and served primarily to reward
union membership.
Second, the Dairylea presumption serves to distinguish unequivocally between superseniority clauses limited to layoff and
recall, and all others. The result of providing negotiators with
such a presumption is that substantive restraints upon collective
bargaining stemming from uncertainty are reduced, because negotiators have some guidance as to what types of superseniority
clauses will be approved. Nevertheless this effect of minimizing
uncertainty applies only to that narrow class of superseniority provisions limited to layoff and recall. Beyond that, any clauses must
meet the Great Dane standards. As a result, the Dairylea goal of
reducing uncertainty is not effectuated. Moreover, the fact that
the negotiators bear the burden of offering justification for all
clauses not limited to layoff and recall reduces the flexibility of the
parties in making compromises to arrive at an agreement.
III.

POST-DAIRYLE DECISIONS

In Dairylea,the Board deliberately left open the possibility of
union or employer justification for the use of superseniority beyond layoff and recall.77 Subsequent cases involving the validity
of superseniority clauses have addressed the scope of those provisions that must be justified under the Dairylea standard. The result has been a progressive dilution of Dairylea, or alternatively,
the expansion of the type of clauses that will be validated upon
Board review. In fact, the Board has found all the superseniority
clauses reviewed to be presumptively legal, except those all-encompassing provisions that grant superseniority for all available
benefits.7 8 This retreat from the strict Dairylea standard is evident
in two major respects. First, the Board has been willing to sanction superseniority clauses that protect stewards from demotion
76. Id at 1166 n.7.
77. 219 N.L.R.B. at 658.
78. Eg., Allied Super Mkts., Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 96 L.R.R.M. 1600 (Nov. 16,
1977); General Drivers and Helpers Local 823, 232 N.L.R.B. No. 129, 97 L.R.R.M. 1191
(Sept. 30, 1977); Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers Local 633, 230 N.L.R.B. 81 (1977); Auto
Warehousers, Inc. and Teamsters Local 47, 227 N.L.R.B. 628 (1976).
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and allow them to bump laterally7 9 employees with greater actual
seniority.8" Second, the Board has broadened the class of employees who benefit from superseniority by permitting lateral bumping
to be exercised by recording secretaries and union officers. 8 '
Initially, the Board acted to prevent interpretations of Dairylea
which would deny a union steward his job classification in the
event of layoff. This is evident in both Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians Local 780 (McGregor-Werner,Inc.)82 and Hospital
Service Plan and Local 32, Office and ProfessionalEmployees.8 3
Both cases involved superseniority clauses which were properly
limited to layoff and recall. However, the union stewards exercised their superseniority to displace a more senior employee by
bumping laterally, thereby enabling the stewards to retain their
job classifications.8 4
The General Counsel argued in both cases that the exercise of
superseniority to permit a steward to retain his same grade level
exceeded the scope of the Dairylea standard, which sanctioned
superseniority only to the extent necessary to guarantee retention
of the steward on the job.85 The Board rejected the General
Counsel's arguments in each case. In McGregor-Werner, the
Board determined that the right to bump laterally serves the legitimate purpose of encouraging the continued presence of the steward on the job.8 6 The Board employed the same rationale in
HospitalService Plan, reasoning that "[t]o require a steward to
exercise his superseniority only to take the lowest rated job rather
than be laid off would hardly aid in retaining stewards."8 7
In Parker-Hannjfn Corp. andDistrict 8, InternationalAssociation of Machinists andAerospace Workers,8 the Board again ac79. Lateral bumping refers to the displacement of an employee to a lower labor
classification. C. RANDLE & M. WoRTMAN, supra note 5, at 510.
80. E.., Parker-Hannifin Corp. and Dist. 8, Int'l Ass'n of Machs. and Aerospace
Workers, 231 N.L.R.B. 884 (1977); Hospital Serv. Plan and Local 32, Office and Professional Employees, 227 N.L.R.B. 585 (1976); Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians (McGregor-Werner, Inc.), 227 N.L.R.B. 558 (1976). See text accompanying notes 84-103 infra.
81. E.g., Otis Elevator Co. and Local 489, Int'l Union of Elect., Radio and Mach.
Workers, 231 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1977); United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers Local 623
(Limpco Mfg. Co.), 230 N.L.R.B. 406 (1977). See text accompanying notes 104-20 infra.
82. 227 N.L.R.B. 558 (1976).
83. 227 N.L.R.B. 585 (1976).
84. 227 N.L.R.B. at 558-59; 227 N.L.R.B. at 585.
85. 227 N.L.R.B. at 558-59; 227 N.L.R.B. at 585.
86. 227 N.L.R.B. at 559.
87. 227 N.L.R.B. at 586.
88. 231 N.L.R.B. 884 (1976).
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cepted the steward retention argument for preventing steward
demotion. In that case, the steward used his superseniority to
bump a more senior employee to a lower labor classification.8 9
The record established that the steward could have avoided layoff
by accepting the lower classification himself.90 The General
Counsel argued that the superseniority clause in Parker-Hannfn
violated the Dairylea standard because it enabled the steward to
obtain the better of two available jobs without legitimate justification based on the steward's duties. The steward would have remained an active employee at the plant in any event. 9' Moreover,
the steward received a substantial economic benefit of over three
thousand dollars a year by virtue of his new position. 92 In reliance upon its decisions in McGregor-Werner and HospitalService
Plan, the Board upheld the legality of the superseniority provision, and held that superseniority which permits a steward to
maintain his status--or nearly equivalent status-in the event of a
slowdown is not presumptively unlawful.9 3 The economic gain realized by the steward in Parker-Hannjin was justified on the
ground that it was incidental to the aim of protecting the steward
from layoff.94
The Board in McGregor-Werner, Hospital Service Plan, and
Parker-Hannjfn 95 consistently rejected the argument that superseniority may be invoked only to prevent an actual layoff. The
rationale is that superseniority which, in the event of layoff, permits a steward to retain his particularjob or classification and protects him from downgrading is a reasonable means to accomplish
the legitimate end of keeping him on the job.96 This rationale departs from Dairylea. As Member Jenkins reiterated in his dissent
in Parker-Hannfin, Dairylea sanctioned superseniority clauses
limited to layoff and recall in recognition of three factors: "(1) the
role the steward plays in the day-to-day administration of the collective bargaining agreement, (2) the fact that his performance in89. Id
90. Id
91. Id at 884-85.
92. Id at 885.
93. Id
94. Id
95. See also Expedient Services, Inc. and Int'l Ass'n of Machs. and Aerospace Workers Local 1306, 231 N.L.R.B. 938 (1977).
96. Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians Local 780 (McGregor-werner, Inc.), 227
N.L.R.B. 558, 559 (1976); Hospital Serv. Plan and Local 32, Office and Professional Employees, 227 N.L.R.B. 585, 586 (1976); Parker-Hannifin Corp. and Dist. 8, Int'l Ass'n of
Machs. and Aerospace Workers, 231 N.L.R.B. 884, 884-85 (1976).
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ures to the benefit of all the employees, and (3) the fact that his
presence on the job is necessary for such performance."97 The
downgrading of a steward does not in and of itself impede him in
the effective performance of his official duties, nor does preventing
a steward from taking a lower paying job benefit directly all of the
unit's employees.9" The majority in Parker-Hann(fin acknowledged that a superseniority clause which prevents the downgrading of a steward grants more protection than that which is strictly
necessary to protect him from layoff. A steward could still perform his official duties as long as he remained on the job in any
capacity.99 Nevertheless, the majority conceded that "such [a]
strict application of Dairylea. . . ignores the realities of collective
bargaining and the working relationship between employer and
employees. The difficulties in negotiating, drafting, and administering a collective bargaining agreement must of practical necessity permit a degree of flexibility, albeit limited, in the formulation
of superseniority clauses." 1"
The Board's willingness to modify the impact of Dairylea is
also evidenced in United Electrical,Radio and Machine Workers
Local 623 (Limpco Manufacturing Co.).'°" In Limpco, a union's
recording secretary bumped a more senior employee during a
layoff under a superseniority clause that was applicable to union
officers as well as stewards. The General Counsel argued that
Dairyleamade it unlawful to extend superseniority to individuals
not directly involved in the initiation and processing of grievances.10 2 A Board majority disagreed. It expressly decided that
Dairylea did not establish the principle that superseniority is presumptively valid only when the individual is engaged in the func03
tion of processing or adjusting grievances at the workplace.1
The Limpco majority expanded the policy enunciated in Dairylea
that superseniority limited to layoff and recall was presumptively
valid because it furthered the "effective administration of bargaining agreements. . . by encouraging the continued presence of the
steward on the job.""' The majority concluded that the official
97.
98.
99.
I00.
101.

231 N.L.R.B. at 885 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
Id at 886 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
Id at 884.
Id at 885.
230 N.L.R.B. 406 (1977).

102. Id at 406-07.
103. Id at 407-08.
104. Dairylea Coop., Inc. and Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 219
N.L.R.B. 656, 658 (1975), cited with approvalin 230 N.L.R.B. at 407.
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responsibilities of a recording secretary bore a direct relationship
to the effective and efficient representation of the unit employees,
thus entitling the secretary to the benefit of the same presumption
offered stewards by Dairylea.1°5
Members Jenkins and Penelo claimed in dissent that the majority had unnecessarily broadened the beneficiary class of superseniority clauses." °6 They viewed the grant of superseniority to a
recording secretary as an unjustifiable benefit simply to the immediate beneficiary, rather than as a benefit to all employees. They
further maintained that under Dairylea, only the processing of
grievances and the enforcing of the collective bargaining agree0 7
ment on the job protected the section 7 rights of employees.
The dissenters feared that the effect of the Limpco decision would
be to create the opportunity for a union to give every union member or activist an office it considered crucial to the collective bargaining process, and thereby legitimize a grant of superseniority
status to that person. 10 8
This fear was realized in a case decided several months after
Limpco-Otis Elevator Co. andLocal 489, InternationalUnion of
Electrical,Radio andMachine Workers, AFL-CIO. °9 In reliance
upon its decision in Limpco, the Board allowed fourteen union
officers to invoke superseniority and to bump laterally when layoffs reduced a bargaining unit from one hundred and forty-four to
thirty-five employees." 0 The General Counsel, arguing that the
superseniority clause violated Dairylea,claimed that the employer
and union had failed to show that all union officials had been involved in grievance processing or that fourteen officers were necessary in a thirty-five employee unit."'I The Board disagreed with
the General Counsel's argument. Following the reasoning in
Limpco," 2 the Board majority held that the officers were entitled
to superseniority because in their official capacities they promoted
the overall administration of the bargaining agreement and con105. 230 N.L.R.B. at 407-08. In Limpco, the recording secretary maintained records of
membership and meetings, handled correspondence for Local 623, posted notices of meetings, aided in obtaining reimbursement for stewards for time lost to their union duties,
informally participated in processing grievances, attended meetings to formulate bargaining ideas, and aided in organizing pickets during a strike.
106. Id at 409-10 (Jenkins & Penello, Members, dissenting).
107. Id (Jenkins & Penello, Members, dissenting).
108. Id (Jenkins & Penello, Members, dissenting).
109. 231 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1977).
110. Id at 1129.
111. Id
112. See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
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tributed to the ability of the union to represent the unit efficiently
officers in a
and effectively." 3 The fact that there were fourteen
4
immaterial."
therefore,
was,
unit
man
thirty-five
As in Limpco, Members Jenkins and Penello dissented. They
asserted that union officers whose presence is not necessary for onthe-job adjustment of grievances ought not be allowed to invoke
superseniority under Dairylea."5 Moreover, the dissenters noted

that a ratio of two union representatives to every three rank-andfile employees vividly illustrated their prediction that any union
member could be given an office deemed crucial to collective bar-

gaining, and thereby gain an unwarranted degree of job security
by invoking superseniority.116
Indeed, Limpco and Otis Elevator appear to give unions and

employers the opportunity to circumvent Dairylea by merely
designating a certain union member as necessary to the efficient

and effective representation of the unit employees. In light of McGregor-Werner, Hospital Service Plan, and Parker-Hannon,
Limpco and Otis Elevator reveal the Board's willingness to dilute
the Dairylea standard to accommodate the need for flexibility in

negotiating and administering collective bargaining agreements.
Although the Board in Dairylea-afterweighing the discriminatory effects of superseniority against its benefit to the unit as a
whole-would have sanctioned superseniority when it encouraged
the steward's continued presence on the job," 7 the Board's postDairylea decisions implicitly acknowledge that the Dairylea stan-

dard may not represent a proper balance.
A review of the above cases reveals that several common

strands are apparent in the post-Dairylea decisions. Each of the
113. 231 N.L.R.B. at 1129.
114. Id at 1130. The union officials in this case were acting as de facto stewards since
the union had eliminated the position of steward in the midst of massive layoffs. Five
union stewards lost their superseniority and were laid off. Consequently, five other employees with greater actual seniority were allowed to remain on the job. The Administrative Law Judge considered this a good faith effort on the part of the union to limit the
adverse effect on other employees due to the exercise of superseniority. Id. at 1129. Dissenting Board members Jenkins and Penello discounted the role of the officers as "de facto
stewards" because the record did not indicate that formal notice of this change in duties
was ever conveyed to either the employees or the employer. Id at 1131 (Jenkins & Penello,
Members, dissenting).
115. Id at 1130-31 (Jenkins & Penello, Members, dissenting). The dissenters noted
that Dairylea sanctioned superseniority for officers involved in the on thejob adjustment of
grievances. Id at 1131 (Jenkins & Penello, Members, dissenting).
116. Id (Jenkins & Penello, Members, dissenting).
117. 219 N.L.R.B. at 658.
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cases relied upon the rationale advanced in Dairylea for upholding superseniority provisions: namely, that superseniority should
be used to encourage the continued employment of the steward to
promote efficient administration of the collective bargaining
agreement. It is ironic that although the Dairylea Board relied
upon this rationale to narrow the scope of presumptively valid
superseniority provisions, the post-Dairylea Board has employed
the same rationale to expand that scope by broadening both the
class of beneficiaries and the range of superseniority benefits
which may be conferred upon those beneficiaries.
With respect to the class of beneficiaries who may properly
receive superseniority benefits, the test has become whether the
employee plays a significant role in the effective administration of
the collective bargaining agreement. 1 8 Thus, the inquiry is not
limited to whether the individual holds the official position of
steward; rather, as evidenced in Otis Elevator, those employees
who act as de facto stewards can qualify for superseniority benefits."I And, as is apparent from Limpco, superseniority may also
be extended to one not engaged in processing or adjusting grievances on the job. 12 Moreover, in evaluating the validity of the
types of benefits conferred by a particular superseniority clause,
the Board has departed from a strict reading of Dairylea. The
retention of key union officials on the job as a justification for the
exercise of superseniority does not dictate that the individual accept a lower job classification to avoid layoff. Furthermore, according to Parker-Hannfn, the fact that the individual might
receive an economic gain does not invalidate the provision, provided that the gain is incidental to the larger purpose of ensuring
the individual's continued employment. 2 '
Perhaps implicit in this expansion of Dairyleais a recognition
by the Board that negotiators need more guidance with respect to
the use of superseniority clauses. It is clear at this point that those
clauses, such as the one in Dairylea, that enable a union member
to use his superseniority to gain preference in all contractual benefits will be invalidated since they go beyond the benefits that are
118. Otis Elevator Co. and Local 489, Int'l Union of Elec. and Mach. Workers, 231
N.L.R.B. 1128, 1129 (1977).
119. Id See note 114 supra.
120. 230 N.L.R.. at 407.
121. 231 N.L.R.B. at 885-86.
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necessary to keep the steward on the job.12 2 Furthermore, as a
result of a wider range of superseniority provisions receiving approval by the Board, labor and management have more Board assurance upon which they can rely in negotiating a superseniority
clause. To this extent, the expansion of the Dairyleapresumption
may contribute to certainty in the collective bargaining process.
Yet the enlargement of the scope of clauses which are approved
by the Board signifies further deviation from Board policy of noninterference with substantive collective bargaining. 23 The degree
to which this type of interference by the Board may curtail the
flexibility of the parties in reaching an agreement is mitigated,
however, by the Board's propensity to approve nearly all types of
superseniority provisions. Thus, in some respects parties have
greater freedom to choose which types of clauses are most appropriate in light of their needs, bargaining power, and skills, without
being forced to bargain with a view toward whether sufficient justification can be devised to convince the Board of the validity of a
particular provision under Dairylea.
Another result of the post-Dairylea expansion is that it adversely affects a greater number of individual rank-and-file members who hold high actual seniority. This "demotion" effect upon
the rank-and-file is nevertheless consistent with the justification
for superseniority recognized in the post-Dairylea cases, that is,
the necessity of protecting the continued presence of key union
officials on the job. 124 The reason that the Board considers such
protection necessary, despite the adverse effect upon the rank-andfile, grows out of the Board's longstanding recognition of the role
that union negotiators play in the collective bargaining process.
As collective bargaining functions, union negotiators serve to represent and promote the interests of rank-and-fie members. 25 The
more effective the union representatives are, the more adequately
they can protect the collective interests of the rank-and-file. The
continuity of key union members on the job enhances the opportunity of union negotiators to establish rapport with management
representatives and to develop increased skills and bargaining
power, all of which promote more effective union representation
for rank-and-fie members. Thus, while the use of superseniority
122. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
123. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
124. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1166 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1976).
125. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
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provisions may "demote" a few individuals who have higher actual seniority, rank-and-file members as a group benefit from
more effective union representation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite the expansion of the Dairylea standard, the Board still
adheres to Dairylea as a controlling decision. The standard was
established to protect employee rights and to provide a presumption upon which negotiators could rely. Yet, in light of the longstanding Board policy of noninterference with the substance of
collective bargaining, as well as the need for both flexibility and
guidance in negotiations, Dairylea may not represent the most desirable accommodation of these goals. The shortcomings of
Dairylea become apparent when analyzed in relation to alternative approaches.
At the one extreme stands Member Fanning's view that a stiff
burden of proof should be imposed upon the General Counsel arguing to invalidate superseniority clauses. Fanning would void a
superseniority clause only if unlawful purpose were shown by direct evidence; no inference would be permitted.' 26 This standard
is not only unduly burdensome, but also disregards the principles
of proof enunciated by GreatDane.'2 7 Moreover, such a standard
seems to render a collective bargaining provision sacrosanct simply because it is part of a contract. Matters such as seniority are
required to conform to the NLRA,' 2 8 and Fanning's view dilutes
the protection afforded by the Act. On the other hand, the approach affords the maximum flexibility in contrast to a presumption which makes it more difficult for negotiators to accommodate
the variations in seniority practices within individual plants. This
flexibility is maximized because under Fanning's view, the Board
would give full force to its traditional policy of self-restraint.
A high degree of flexibility is still available to negotiators
under the Supreme Court framework. More protection is given to
employee rights, however, because under the standards established by Great Dane, the General Counsel may prove improper
motive by inference. Moreover, the approach does not contem126. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 37-45 supra and accompanying text.
128. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). See, e.g., United Steelworkers Local
1070, 171 N.L.R.B. 945, 946 (1968).
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plate Board interference with collective bargaining by mandating
the types of superseniority provisions which are valid.
The Supreme Court framework is still in effect, despite the
Board's decision in Dairylea. In fact, the principles of proof outlined by Great Dane are used to determine whether any justification proffered for a superseniority provision going beyond layoff
and recall is sufficient to rebut a presumption of illegality. 129 Unlike Great Dane, however, Dairylea reduces bargaining flexibility
and acts as a substantive restraint on negotiation in two respects.
First, the presumption of illegality attaches to a wide array of
superseniority clauses under Dairylea. Thus negotiators must bargain not knowing whether they will be able to rebut the Dairylea
presumption. This uncertainty may compel them to limit their
superseniority provisions to layoff and recall, regardless of
whether a broader clause would be more appropriate for the respective parties. Second, the Board's decision constitutes a deviation from its policy of self-restraint in that Dairylea specifies
which clause the Board prefers and sets up machinery to enforce
that preference.
Cases subsequent to Dairylea implicitly recognize the
problems inherent in Dairylea. Specifically, the cases reflect an
attempt to provide negotiators with a guide to the types of superseniority clauses that the Board will approve. The Board has expanded the legal boundaries for superseniority clauses by
applying the rationale that superseniority is necessary to protect
the continued presence of union officials on the job. Although
Board guidance fulfills the Dairyleagoal of providing negotiators
with a clear-cut rule upon which they can rely, the concomitant of
this increased guidance is increased Board interference with the
substance of collective bargaining. At first blush, it would appear
that increased interference would reduce flexibility in negotiation
further than in Dairylea. Yet, the fact that negotiators can safely
rely on such a wide array of clauses now sanctioned by the Board
at least gives negotiators some freedom to tailor the provision according to the respective power, needs, and bargaining skills of the
parties. Nevertheless, despite the benefits afforded by the postDairyleadecisions, there is no assurance that new types of superseniority clauses that may arise in future collective bargaining
agreements will be approved by the Board. This uncertainty acts
129. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1166 (2d
Cir. 1976).
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to reduce the flexibility of negotiators to draft new clauses which
might be better suited for the particular parties involved.
In light of the above problems with Dairylea and its progeny,
it may be desirable for the Board to return to the Supreme Court
framework. If the Board chose to revert to Great Dane, employee
rights would be protected to the same extent as accorded by
Dairylea since each case requires that a justification be offered for
the superseniority provision at issue. At the same time, the Board
could reaffirm its policy of noninterference with the substance of
collective bargaining and thus not upset the delicate balance
struck by the negotiating parties. It is interesting to note that as a
result of the post-Dairyleaexpansion, the Board in a recent superseniority case has employed the kind of analysis characteristic of
the Supreme Court framework. In PerfectionAutomotive Products
Corp.,' 30 the agreeement contained a clause which, like the clause
in Dairylea,granted superseniority to a union steward for all purposes. However, the steward derived no benefit from this provision because of his already high actual seniority. Nevertheless,
the Board, in apparent disregard of its customary reasoning under
the Dairylea framework, found the clause unlawful because of
"the inherent tendency of such clauses to discriminate against employees for union-related reasons." 3 ' Dissenting Member Fanning accused the majority of adopting a per se approach
and
32
finding a violation because of the mere existence of the clause.1
At least implicitly, the Board had merely employed the Great
Dane test that invalidates provisions which have an inherent tendency to reward union membership regardless of any union or
133
employer justification.
The Board's deviation from its traditional policy of noninterference with the substance of collective bargaining in its evaluation of superseniority clauses, as well as its difficulty in reaching a
resolute stance on how to determine the validity of these provisions, 134 highlights the sensitivity of the issue of superseniority in
130. 232 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 97 L.R.R.M. 1068 (Sept. 30, 1977).
131. Id at 1069 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
132. Id
133. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
134. Dissenting opinions were filed in Dairylea Coop., Inc. and Milk Drivers & Dairy
Employees, 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 661 (1975) (Fanning, Member, dissenting); as well as in
United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers Local 623 (Limpco Mfg. Co.), 230 N.L.R.B. 406,
409 (1977) (Jenkins & Penello, Members, dissenting); Parker-Hannifin Corp. and Dist. 8,
Int'l Ass'n of Machs. and Aerospace Workers, 231 N.L.R.B. 884, 885 (1977) (Jenkins &
Penello, Members, dissenting); and Otis Elevator Co. and Local 489, Int'l Union of Elec.,
Radio and Mach. Workers, 231 N.L.R.B. 1128, 1129-30 (1977) (Jenkins & Penello, Members, dissenting).
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the context of current labor relations. Sufficient latitude is needed
for unions and employers to accommodate their interests as well
135
as the competing interests among the various unit employees.
When a collective bargaining agreement represents a reasonable
accommodation of the interests of employer, union, and individual employees, the Board should intrude only to protect employee
rights guaranteed by the Act. This is the degree of flexibility that
should be permitted in light of the inherent difficulties to negotiating superseniority provisions, as evidenced by the post-Dairylea
cases.
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135. See Clark, The Duty f/FairRepresentation: 4 TheoreticalStructure, 51 TEx. L.
Rav. 1119, 1155-60 (1973).

